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KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
TORTs-NEGLIGENCE-WhONGFuL DEATH ACIONS FoR PIENATAL INjuiyt-Plaintiff brought this action as administrator of the estate of his

deceased infant, alleged to have died en ventre sa mere as a direct
result of injuries negligently inflicted by defendant during the last
stages of gestation. Plaintiff was driving with his wife in a truck when
defendant negligently forced them from the road, causing the wife
and her unborn child to be so injured that the child was born dead.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Ken-

tucky statutes made no provision for a recovery based upon the wrongful death of an unborn child. Plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed.
Section 241 of the Constitution of Kentucky and KRS 411.180, enacted pursuant thereto, provide that whenever the death of a person
results from an injury inflicted by the negligence of another, damages
may be recovered by the personal representative of the' deceased. An
unborn child, if viable, is a person within the meaning of these two
provisions. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W. 2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
At common law, prenatal injury afforded no right of action, either
to the injured child or to his parents.' It was asserted by the courts,
both here and in England, that an unborn child has no identity separate from that of his mother, and that the foetus, not being a presently existing human being, is not entitled to an action for personal
allowing such an action was that causainjury. A second objection to
2
proof.
of
difficult
too
tion is
The situation remained static until the beginning of this century
when legal writers began to attack the position of the courts.3 Concurrently, a new judicial attitude began to make itself felt in the form
of dicta and dissenting opinions. 4 This attitude first took the form of
holding in 1923, when the Louisiana court allowed recovery in a case
where the injured foetus died three days after birth. 5
This case represented a much-needed breach in the wall of stare
decisis, but the better part of two decades passed before this decision
was supplemented by a similar decision in California in 1939.0 Still,
the writers kept criticizing the position of the majority of states, and
in 1946 a decision in the District of Columbia 7 precipitated a relatively
2I Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 188, 189 (D.C. 1946) (dictum).

PRossF-, TORTS 174 (2d ed. 1955).
3 Morris, Injuries to Infants en Ventre Sa Mere, 58 CENT. L.J. 148 (1904);

Kerr, Action by Unborn Infant, 61 CENT. L.J. 864 (1905).
4 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 859, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)

(dis-

sent); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 154 App. Div. 667, 189 N.Y.S. 867, 868
(1913) (dictum); Drobner v. Peters, 282 N.Y. 220, 188 N.E. 567, 568 (1921)

(dictum).
1 Cooper v. Blanck, 89 So. 2d 852 (La. 1928).
6 Scott v. McPheeters, 88 Cal. App. Rep. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939).

7 Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 1.
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large group of decisions, occurring within a ten year period, which
supported the right of a child injured en ventre sa mere to recover
from the wrongdoer. The writer uses the word "precipitated" advisedly; the state courts since 1946 have been consistent in using the
District of Columbia case as authority, and it is probable that the
prestige of the federal district court which decided that case has had
much to do with the decisions of the state courts. Since 1946, courts in
ten jurisdictions have held that the unborn child is as much a person
as his mother.8
At the time of writing, research indicates that courts of thirteen
states have recognized a right of action for prenatal injury, while
those in nine states have expressly declined to do so. 9 The remaining
states have not been presented with the question.
The nine state minority, however, is not as significant as mere numbers indicate. In Massachusetts, the court bowed to precedent, saying:
"We do not indicate what our decision would be if the question were
presented for the first time."' 0 The New Jersey court denied the action
for prenatal injury, but a strong (five to ten) dissent endorsed it."
In Nebraska, the court declined to allow a wrongful death action by
the estate of an unborn child, but intimated that its decision would
be different if the child had been born alive. 12 The decisions in the
other six states were made before 1946, when only two states recognized the action for prenatal injury. What the courts in those six
states would do if the question were presented in 1956 is, at least,
debatable.
In light of the situation as it appears today, it seems fair to predict
that the development of the law as to prenatal injury will continue in
the pattern set by the progressive Louisiana court in 1923.
It is indeed difficult to find justice in a rule of law which denies an
infant a right of action for his injury simply because it occurred prior
to his birth. Is negligence toward an unborn child not so wrong as
negligence toward someone else? Is the foetus less deserving of our
8Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A. 2d 14
(1955); Tucker v. Carmichael, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951); Amann v.
Faidy, 415 Ill.
422, 114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md.
417, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d
838 (1949); Steggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W. 2d 577 (1953); Woods
v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid
Transit Co., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291
P. 2d 225 (Ore. 1955).
9 These states are Alabama, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. See Anno. 10 A.L.R. 2d 1059
(1950); 27 A.L.R. 2d 1256 (1953) and Supplement, p. 1344 (1956).
10 Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E. 2d 206, 207 (1950).
11 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942).
12 Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951).
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protection than the independent adult? Far from it. Why then, did
the courts in the beginning see fit to deny the unborn child his
remedy? It is submitted that the objection as to difficulty of proof was
the real, and actually the only, barrier to this action in the beginning.
In the modern time, it would appear unwarranted, in view of the
proficiency of medical science, to say that causation is too uncertain of
proof in the case of a prenatal injury. In the early days of the common law, however, the objection would seem to be valid. In an age
when "Evil humours" were cured by bleeding, when midwives presided, for the most part, over birth, and when congenital deformities
were attributed to evil spirits, it is no difficult to understand why the
courts felt that an injury occuring within the obscure and mystic
process of gestation might be difficult of explanation. If such an objection might still be offered, the Kentucky court in the instant case
disposed of this objection with the following words: "In the eyes of
the law it is a wrongful concept that uncertainty of proof can ever
destroy a legal right."' 3
The objection that the unborn child is not a person is hardly valid.
It is a statement of result rather than reason. The arguments as to
whether the child qualifies as a member of the human race are irrefutable, both pro and con. In one universe of discourse, the child is a
person as soon as conceived, because his constituent principles are
present at that time, and his future growth is merely the development
of those principles. 14 In another manner of speaking, he is not an "independent" person because he is not separate. If one attitude prevails
over the other, it is due to legal definition, not to the exclusive truth
of the argument.
Having defined "person" in accordance with the decision desired,
the early courts were able to support their opinions with a proposition
which sounded better than the argument that proof would be too difficult.
In overcoming the objection that the child is not a person, the
modern courts, with one exception,' 5 have used the "viability theory."
A viable child is one who could, if severed from his mother, live independently. The courts have used this possibility of independent life
as the basis for saying that a child, if viable, is a separate person, and
entitled to recover for personal injury.
Since viability usually occurs between the sixth and seventh months
of pregnancy, 16 this reasoning leaves without redress the foetus in'3 Mitchell v. Couch, 283 S.W. 2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
14 BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 227

).
(10th ed.
15 Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (1953).
16 Dx LEE, PluNcnLEs & PxAcrIcE oF OBSTEmUCS 58 (7th ed. 1938).
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jured earlier, although he is a victim of the same negligence as his
older brother, is born into the same world, and may bear throughout
life the same disability or disfigurement. There is either, justice nor
logic in such a paradox, if proof, in the two cases, is equally conclusive.
The viability theory may be compared to a double-edged sword.
The courts have used it successfully to overcome the objection that
the child is not a person, but have, in so doing, placed upon themselves a convenient, but unfortunate, limitation, if the language of the
viability theory is followed strictly in the future. This language, of
course, has been used in cases involving viable infants, and the courts
have not, strictly speaking, bound themselves to deny recover to a
prenatally injured non-viable infant.
Prosser says of the viability theory: "There appears to be no good
reason for the distinction, which will inevitably involve difficult ques17
tions of proof."
The viability theory has been discarded by a New York court.' 8
The court which dropped the distinction handled the problem of the
child's status as a person most effectively, stating that the right to recover should be based not upon severability, but upon legal separability. At the moment of conception, a separate organism is created.
From this time forward, the function of the mother is to nourish and
protect the separate, living organism within her body. It is true that
the child, before viability, could not live if taken from the mother,
but this is not to say that it is not separate; this is merely to say that
the conditions necessary to survival have been removed.
Conclusion: Although the Kentucky court has made an admirable
decision in recognizing a right of action for death occurring prenatally,
it has unfortunately chosen language which indicates that viability will
be the dividing line in future prenatal injury cases. The court, however, is free to use this case as a guidepost, rather than as a limitationto discard the viability theory in future cases.
JESSE S. HoOG
17 PRossE, supra note 2, 175.

18 Kelly v. Gregory, supra note 15.

